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SC 11596-63

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

for

Examination of Certain Aspects of the Observation

Post Proposal by A-C-D-A

5 December 1963

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

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BACKGROUND

As a follow-on to the nuclear test ban agreement, the Soviets may be willing to engage in meaningful negotiations regarding the establishment of observational surveillance systems of conventional military forces in both the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO powers as a means of avoiding surprise attack by either side, especially one resulting from misunderstanding, miscalculation, escalation of ostensible counter-measures, and the like. Several variations of the observation post concept have been proposed by both the US and the USSR since 1955.

The present (30 August 1963) Soviet position is that the observation post question must be examined in the context of the November 1958 proposal of the USSR, which links any observational system to measures of disarmament and denuclearization in a manner not acceptable to the West. However, there is the possibility, especially after the ratification of the test ban treaty, that meaningful negotiations could be conducted with the Soviets on this matter.

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SCOPE AND PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to provide the DCI with a vest-pocket briefing aid primarily for opportunity use at various points in the intricate and prolonged procedures necessary to formulate a US position paper on such a delicate and widely ramified matter as observation of opposing conventional military forces by the West and the Warsaw Pact nations. The focus of this study will be on significant aspects of designing, establishing and operating an observational system within the physical borders of Warsaw Pact countries. The study will not be concerned with the reciprocal observation system in the West. Neither will this study address negotiational procedures or possible alternative formulations of the system to be used in such negotiations. The strictly operational military aspects of this matter are left to the study done by DIA for the JCS, and recently forwarded to ACDA as requested. The strictly political aspects are left to a separate paper. This is not to say that military and political considerations will be ignored. Rather, each will be examined as appropriate in relation to national intelligence aspects to bring out the broad strategic interests of the US in this somewhat intricate matter.

The working task is to develop the background, relevant facts, and some alternative formulations of an observational system in the Warsaw Pact countries so as to enable the DCI to participate in at will and to guide as appropriate the US preparatory and negotiational steps with a minimum of referral questions of a tactical nature.

The key assumptions listed below further delineate the metes and bounds of the briefing note for the DCI.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. That any Observation Post System (OPs) in Warsaw Pact Territory* will be aimed at observing and reporting activities related to surprise attack by conventional surface forces of any Warsaw Pact

*The assumptions focus on a NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiated arrangement. The terms focus on the essential considerations that would be common to various kinds of OP systems and agreements, and, thus, are intended to develop a broad spectrum readiness within the CIA components to handle future queries from the DCI or from agencies having operational responsibilities for developing positional papers or back-stopping negotiations.

country against adjacent Western nations. (ICBM's, Space Weapon Systems and other unconventional methods of attack are not considered here).

2. That any OPs in Warsaw Pact Territory will be based upon a NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement, that the OPs will be manned by NATO nationals, that logistical support of the OPs will be provided through the most convenient and economic NATO-member national means.

3. That a NATO Early Warning (EW) Center will be established, that the Center will be staffed by NATO nationals, that the Center will have continuing access to appropriate or relevant non-sensitive intelligence materials of NATO members, and that the Center will have continuing access to operational plans and activities of the NATO members as they may affect analysis of the incoming reporting from the OPs.

4. That all OPs observers will report all early warning indications and background material direct to the NATO EW Center, that the OPs reporters will have continuous and high-speed communications with the NATO EW Center and with each other. That communication procedures will enable the passing of observational responsibilities of selected activities from observer to observer and from zone to zone.

5. That the NATO member national EW intelligence efforts will continue, and that certain intelligence will be regarded as too sensitive to pool in the NATO EW Center.

6. That the NATO EW Center will concentrate upon what is in effect tactical early warning of a conventional attack on a local front or a theatre level, and that the preliminary output analyses and EW judgments will be fed to the national EW centers of the NATO members.

7. That the NATO member EW Centers will receive full delivery of all OPs reporting at the same time that such reporting flows into the NATO EW Center, that this will be blended with all other information relating to the NATO local front or theatre EW assessment, that this will be scrutinized in relation to events outside the area of primary possible action both before and during the critical build-up, that this scrutiny will include US or Western operational activities in the strategic sense, and that the forthcoming EW judgment will ultimately be viewed in light of the broader alternatives confronting the USSR and their attendant risks and prospects.

8. That the preceding processes can provide the top political levels in the NATO countries the tactical and strategic underpinnings for a collected and collective response by NATO governments to any advance warning.

GUIDE QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND DRAFTING

Note: For comparative discussion purposes, this study will address three main types of OP systems:

1. Fixed land posts, with full ground mobility for observer within very limited radius and eyeballs and binoculars for observation.
2. Fixed land posts, with full ground mobility within a very broad zone around post, and with any observational or listening extensors desired.
3. Fixed land posts, with unlimited ground and air mobility, plus any sensor extension devices desired.

OPs Structure, Manning, Equipment, etc.

1. What are the key elements to consider in designing any kind of an observation system, i.e., number and location of posts, staffing, mobility and access of observers, sensor extensions to be used, communications, logistics support, degree of warning and lead-time desired, (supplemental sources of EW information), reaction time at local, theatre and strategic levels, etc. CRP/TR

2. What are the broader considerations in designing and evaluating any practical OPs, i.e., the limitations on what can be observed, the limitations on what can be learned about enemy intentions from observations, the degree of surveillance that we would be willing to impose on ourselves, the communications equipment limitations as to speed and accuracy of reporting, the linguistic word and concept transfer problem arising from mixed national teams at the observation and reporting points as well as at the analytic center, etc. TR-?

3. How many posts would be needed under the three OPs specified in the above note? Where would these be located? How many observers would be required for continuous surveillance? What are the desirable and undesirable features of these various OPs mixes? CRP/TR

OPs Advance Warning Capability

4. In what kinds of surprise attack would any OPs be valuable? Not valuable? Not useful at all? What degrees of certainty of advance warning could be expected from each of the OPs systems considered?

5. What lead-times could be expected for each of the different degrees of certainty in advance warning? How would this lead-time probably vary for the primary different scales and kinds of attack?

a. Limited scale, flash attack, such as, seizure of Berlin, Istanbul, Helsinki?

b. Full scale assault along key sectors with forces in place, such as, West German border.

c. Full scale assault along Bloc frontiers, with build up of forces from within USSR.

6. Could we expect to obtain conclusive early warning of a surprise attack ahead of the action? Would the degree of certainty of advance warning vary significantly among various major sectors of the Bloc periphery? Why? And to what extent?

7. What capabilities do the Bloc forces have now for both short and longer distance airlift movements of troops and equipment? What impact could this have on the effectiveness of any observation post system? In providing alerts to surprise attacks of the kinds outlined above? What are the probable trends in these regards?

8. How would any pull-back of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces affect the early warning problem? How would a pull-back affect the coverage needed and the methods of operation of an observation post system? Would the EW capability of an observation post system be enhanced? Reduced?

Present Intelligence Information Systems EW Capability

9. What kinds of advance warning for different types and scales of surprise attack, with what lead-times, can we expect to achieve with our existing intelligence collection and EW analysis systems? What are the trends, if any, in the kinds of advance warning we can expect to achieve? What are the variable factors influencing these trends? How would an OPs affect the foregoing trends?

10. In what ways could the input from any contemplated OPs contribute to our present early warning capabilities? Conventional forces only? All forces? Would these contributions be significant? Over the short-term? Long-term? Under what conditions?

11. What technical gear development schedules for other intelligence gathering information systems, or possible changes in access, could affect trends in their contribution to EW, is in the relationship to any OPs contribution?

Denial, Deception, Jamming of OPs Information System


12. To what extent might the Bloc forces be able to avoid observation while preparing to make a surprise attack? How might this probably vary under different kinds of attack? What would be the affect on the possible OPs contributions to early warning?

13. What masking activities could be used by the Bloc forces to conceal normally observed and reported pre-attack activities from OPs observers? How successful might these be under varying pre-attack conditions?

14. Would an OPs be susceptible to false or misleading inputs which could hamper or nullify OPs performance? What particular kinds of inputs might mislead or confuse the OP system? How susceptible would any OPs be to overload inputs on activities by Bloc forces? How would this vary among the OPs mixes considered?

25X1X4

25X1X4



25X1B4d

B4d

25X1B4d

Machine Aids in Observing, Reporting, Analyzing

19. What are the prospects for utilizing machine aids in any OPs operations at the observation and reporting points? Sensor extensions for listening or observation, i.e., radar, radint, etc.? Hi-speed voice communications for urgent reporting? Digitalization of data for hi-speed open transmission of routine reporting? Facsimile reporting, especially for ground photo coverage or the transmission of steno-type or open text? Fixed technical means for recording and reporting equipment movement? What would be the general nature of an activities-reporting system based entirely upon automatic recording and transmission devices? How feasible is this? How can machine aids be used in storing EW analytic base data? In establishing and maintaining data on selected pre-attack activity norms? In graphic presentation of OPs EW results at any given time? What electronic data processing equipment systems are available now? Could be obtained or developed on the short-term? Longer-term?


BCS
OSI
Penny

OP System Reporting Exchange

20. What is the feasibility of having all NATO observational reporting on the Warsaw Pact conventional forces delivered to all Warsaw Pact governments at the same time it is forwarded to the NATO EW Center? What would be the advantages, disadvantages of such an exchange?

OPs
N/C

25X1X4



List of DD/I Officers

Informally Contacted on OPs

Briefing Note for DCI

<u>Function</u>	<u>Officer</u> 25X1A9a	<u>Organization</u>
Indications Analysis		OCI
COMINT Source		CGS/SIGINT
Military Analysis		Mil/Div/OCI
Science and Technology		OSI
RECCE Source		CGS/RECCE
Military Analysis		Military Economic Division/ORR
DD/P		OPs Staff Assistant, DD/P
ACDA Insights		DCI/Liaison Staff-ACDA
25X1B4d		25X1B4d
25X1X4		
Soviet Problem		ONE/Soviet Staff
Transportation Data and Expertise		TR/M&S/ORR

Function

Locational Data
and Analysis
Cartographic Aid

Officer
25X1A9a



Organization

Geographic Area,
ORR

DD/I Detailed Officers
25X1A9a



General Early Warning
Problem

Disarmament

NIC
National War
College
Preparedness
Investigating
Subcommittee of
Senate Armed
Service Committee

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REMARKS:

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